It is widely known that Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president in his final years, struggled with severe alcohol problems. However, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet Party leader, was quite the opposite. Many believe that due to personal family reasons, he thought the best thing for Soviet society would be if people simply stopped drinking altogether. None at all. Alcohol prohibition has been attempted in many parts of the world, but almost everywhere it ended in disaster. Moscow’s experience was no different.
Interestingly, Hungary also saw a communist attempt at alcohol prohibition right after coming to power in March 1919. Although their rule was short-lived and the ban was eventually relaxed, the Soviet prohibition lasted much longer and had far deeper consequences for world history.
- Changing trends: Can alcohol in Hungary still be considered cheap?
The alcohol problem certainly didn’t vanish in Hungary later on either. That’s why, back in December 1975 during the era of “existing socialism,” a so-called Work Therapy Alcohol Withdrawal Institute was established near Szeged, at Nagyfa. At that time, statistics showed there were at least 100,000 alcoholics in Hungary.
The Soviet crackdown on excessive drinking, however, was much harsher and came with more serious consequences.
What was Gorbachev’s problem with alcohol?
When Gorbachev came to power at just 54 years old—considerably younger than his predecessors who were all over 70—he had a sharp awareness of the Soviet Union’s deep-rooted social problems. One of the biggest issues was alcohol and its related health crises.
According to the data of ujkor.hu:
- the average Soviet citizen drank 17 litres of vodka annually, from infants to the elderly. By comparison, consumption was only 14 litres back in 1914.
- drinking started at younger ages—children as young as 10 could often be found intoxicated.
- life expectancy dropped,
- crime rates rose, domestic violence and child mortality increased, and
- workers’ productivity declined.
What actions did Gorbachev take?
Gorbachev didn’t go as far as the total bans of the Tsarist era but introduced strict measures similar in effect to those from 1914:
- reduced vodka production significantly;
- drastically increased prices (the cheapest vodka nearly doubled in price between early 1985 and late 1986 while average wages hovered just above 100 roubles per month);
- banned alcohol sales before 2 pm and after 7 pm;
- imprisoned those caught drinking at work or in public;
- raised the legal drinking age from 18 to 21;
- limited individual purchase quantities;
- destroyed historic vineyards, especially in Georgia and Moldova.
Propaganda efforts were relentless, removing drinking scenes from films and TV shows. Sober events became a trend, with alcohol-free weddings gaining popularity.
What were the consequences of the Soviet alcohol “prohibition”?
Though not an outright ban, access to the Russians’ national drink became extremely difficult, making Gorbachev wildly unpopular. Long queues formed, and even family celebrations struggled without vodka.
Official alcohol consumption dropped steeply, reducing death rates, but illegal distilleries mushroomed. People often bought dangerous, low-quality spirits, which in turn caused a rise in fatalities.
As in the United States during Prohibition, this created space for organised crime to thrive and the black market to explode. Gangsters gained power, sometimes stepping into the void left by the disintegrating state authority.
The Soviet economy was, like Tsarist Russia before it, heavily reliant on state revenues from vodka sales. Alcohol monopolies made up a quarter of the state budget income. The loss of this revenue, compounded by a 69% plunge in oil prices between 1985 and 1986, pushed the Soviet economy to the brink of collapse. Other factors such as unrest in Poland and the Afghan war also played their part.
While some individuals grew fabulously wealthy by effectively privatising the lucrative alcohol trade, the public faced not only vodka shortages and soaring prices but also rationed sugar necessary for home distilling.
In summary, although the measures did reduce alcohol consumption and brought some social benefits, the partial alcohol ban had overwhelmingly negative economic and social repercussions from Moscow’s perspective—contributing significantly to the swift collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and worldwide.
No, fam, the Soviet Union collapsed because it was based on a socioeconomic system that strips individuals of their uniqueness and individuality, disincentivizes ambition, and punishes success.
Any system that presupposes the collective ahead of the individual is doomed to failure.
It doesn’t work even in theory. Think about it: Imagine you were in a class with two other students and you take a quiz. You get 80%, another student gets 50%, and the third gets 30%. The professor then declares that your scores will be added up and (re)distributed equally among you, so each gets 50%. Follow through this thought game and consider how such a system would affect each of the three of you. You will realize that the low-performing one will end up performing even worse, as will the average one, while you will either stop working as hard or will try to change to a school without such a system. And that is EXACTLY what happened and is happening in every single Communist, Marxist, Stalinist, Leninist, Maoist, “Chavistist,” and other collectivist B.S.ist countries.
Communism is a useless, laughable ideology. In any sane world, we would treat it with the same disdain, mockery, and bemusement with which we view feudalism.
Finally, a post from Steiner I completely agree with. Unfortunately, fascism has many of the same economic inefficiencies as communism and that’s what you are getting in Hungary. It’s crony capitalism. How can a plumber manage a vast network of economic enterprises with any kind of expertise? Capital ends up being allocated inefficiently. Managers who don’t have a clue of what they are doing are hired because they are good friends. Employees who have skills leave because they are not properly compensated. Efficient companies run by smart propietors are stifled from expanding because they know they will become a takeover target by the NER. Foreign investors outside of corrupt participants from China or Russia are discouraged from investing in Hungary because of discriminatory rules such as experienced by Spar and mafia pressure on many German owned companies such as Duna Drava where Orban put a 90% mining fee making it lose money on every bag of cement.