Initially only in test mode, but crude deliveries to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline, of which the Russian section was hit by Ukrainian air strikes last week, may resume from Thursday, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó said in a post on social media on Wednesday.
Following a phone call with Pavel Sorokin, Russia’s deputy minister of energy, Szijjártó said that damage to the pipeline transfer point this time was so extensive that restoration work will take several days.
Szijjártó said they reviewed the situation with Pavel Sorokin, and it turned out that the Russian side managed to find a technological solution that will allow restarting crude transports to Hungary from Thursday, initially in test mode and with smaller quantities.
The minister noted that during the break in transports, Hungary has not yet needed to use its strategic reserves, and commercial reserves are still holding up.
“At the same time, I still find it scandalous that some domestic political and media figures are excusing the Ukrainians who blew up the pipeline, while the European Commission is only sending the message that there is no security of supply risk,” Szijjártó said.
“We also call on Ukraine to refrain from further attacking oil pipelines to Hungary and not to endanger the security of our country’s energy supply,” he added.
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The smokescreen surrounding the real motivations behind the bombing of the Druzhba pipeline is almost transparent. Of all the parties involved, Russia is the least affected. While there may be a slight drop in exports, this is nothing more than a drop in the ocean compared to the massive scale of Russia’s oil exports. The true impact is felt most acutely by countries like Hungary and Slovakia, which remain heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. But Russia itself? It has successfully redirected its oil exports to other markets and remains a key player in the global energy trade, despite sanctions.
Countries like Poland and Germany have already stopped using branches of this pipeline due to sanctions and broader strategic considerations. However, it is the smaller nations, such as Hungary and Slovakia, that bear the brunt of the consequences. Their populations are experiencing the harshest effects of rising energy prices and disrupted supplies.
This creates a perfect opportunity to push political agendas. In Hungary, for example, the energy crisis could be a means to pressure the population into voting for a government more aligned with EU interests, one that will be less resistant to the influence of Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. This is likely no accident; in fact, it may be a deliberate strategy to undermine pro-Russian sentiment in certain EU countries, particularly ahead of elections.
Ukraine’s EU membership is another important factor at play here. The crisis surrounding energy supplies could serve as a pretext to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This would not only solidify the political control of the EU over Ukraine, but it would also provide a way for the EU to expand its influence in the region, particularly in the wake of the instability caused by the conflict with Russia. The energy crisis could be seen as an opportunity to push through Ukrainian integration at a faster pace, using the crisis to strengthen the EU’s grip on a key geopolitical player.
The situation regarding the Minsk II Agreement and the alleged role of Zelensky is another layer of the story. As Merkel herself has stated, Ukraine was never given the chance to fully implement Minsk II. Had the agreement been respected, the war may have been avoided. The conflict was not about territory, but about granting autonomy to eastern Ukraine. This was the basis for peace. Yet, as we know, the agreement was not fully adhered to by the parties involved. Zelensky, under pressure from the West—particularly the United States and the UK—was effectively blocked from considering a compromise. This undoubtedly escalated the conflict rather than resolving it.
The Istanbul Agreement, which could have been a breakthrough, was rejected by the West, especially under the influence of leaders like Boris Johnson, who prevented Ukraine from deciding its own peace terms. This undermined Ukraine’s ability to pursue a peaceful solution and made peace even less attainable.
There is a great deal of smoke surrounding the reasons behind the current situation, but if you look closely, you’ll see the powerful forces in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and London, pulling the strings. These leaders not only dictate the direction of the EU but are actively shaping the geopolitical landscape to suit their interest, often in ways that are neither transparent nor fair. Behind the smoke screen of this geopolitical game lie strategic choices that impact nations and their people, frequently in ways that are hidden from the public eye.
Peter you spent a lot of time putting that together. Ukraine has stopped at least 17% of Russia’s refining capacity and there are now gasoline shortages in some areas of Russia. Ukraine keep hitting Druzba and all the rest of Russia’s pipelines and refineries. Hungary will just have to suffer any consequences of chosing not to seek alternate supplies.
@larry, no time whatsoever, since I am writing all of my life
Whether targeting civilian infrastructure, like energy facilities, during conflict is ever justified goes beyond military objectives and touches on far-reaching political and economic consequences. On one hand, if an energy facility is helping fund the enemy’s war effort, attacking it may seem like a valid strategy. But the principles of military necessity and proportionality complicate this. If a power plant serves both military and civilian needs, does its role in supporting the enemy’s military make it a legitimate target? Or does destroying it cause far greater harm to innocent civilians, particularly when the facility is essential to their daily lives?
Things get even more complicated when we consider the global ripple effects: cutting off energy supplies like oil doesn’t just impact the warring parties. Countries that aren’t directly involved in the conflict but rely on that oil might be pushed into difficult positions, often forced to align with larger political pressures, like those from the EU. When energy infrastructure is destroyed, it may not only cripple the enemy’s military, it also places significant strain on neutral countries, indirectly forcing them to comply with political demands by cutting off their access to vital resources. This introduces a dangerous layer of economic warfare, where civilian infrastructure becomes a tool in a much bigger geopolitical game.
This raises fundamental questions about the limits of military action. At what point does military necessity cross the line into disproportionate harm? Should energy facilities, which are essential to the survival of both civilians and broader economies, be fair game simply because they contribute to the enemy’s war effort or global economic pressure? This is an increasingly urgent issue in modern warfare, where military objectives are often intertwined with complex economic and political agendas that affect countries beyond the conflict zone.
International humanitarian law was built for a different era of warfare, and in today’s world, where wars spill over into the global economy, it’s unclear if current laws can adequately address these complex situations. Are we willing to accept that civilian infrastructure can be destroyed to pressure neutral countries or force compliance with political goals? As warfare continues to evolve, these are the uncomfortable questions that need answering.